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In The S11preme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ALVIE CARTER, "' 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
M. A. LINDNER and ERMA M. LINDNER, 
his wife; and W. A. WOOD and ARRAH 
B. WOOD, his wife, 
Defendants, Cross Claimants 
and Appellants, 
-vs-
FRANK R. DOVER and SHIRLEY MAY 
DOVER, his wife, 
Defendants, Cross Def end ants 
and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 
11578 
This is an action to quiet title to a parcel of land 
in Salt Lake City owned by respondents but en-
closed with a fence by appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court quieted the plaintiff's title to the 
property but failed to award any damages for losses 
incurred by respondent Carter. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request that the judgment of the 
trial court quieting title to the property be a_ffirmed 
but that the trial court be directed to award dam-
a_ges to respcnden t Carter for his losses. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The prope:r°~' dssiginic_ted as the "Carter prop-
erty" in appsllants' brief ~Ncs ovv·ned by one Robert 
Dover from 19'.~G until GEcernber of 1957 'Nhen he 
conveyed it to Frank R. Dover and Shirley M. 
Dovor, his wife. They in turn contarcted to sell the 
property to Alvie Carter, the plaintiff-respondent, in 
1964, and Carter took possession thereof. In 1955 
Lindner and Wood, the defendants-a_ppellants, pur-
chased th8 proper+.y adjoining the Carter property 
on the E:ist and Sout:'.-1 and constructed a fence over 
the Carter propsrty theroby c1e~):ri_7j.,,_q Dovrors, and 
later Carter, from using tho South 24.35 feet of the 
Carter p:".'opertv. m. 29-30). Lindner claims that the 
fence was erecfed -with the permission of Robert 
Dover, who was deceased at the time of trial. (R. 63). 
However, when Frank Dever asked Lindner in 1957 
why the £enc:e had been placed so for to the North 
of the boundary line, Lindner answered that it was 
placed there to ma__l<_e up for the encroachment by 
Dover on the East. No mention was made of any 
agreement vrith or oermission from Robert Dover 
to place the fence there. Frank Dover requested 
Liriciner b rs!Y'C'.o::; -foe fence. Lindner replied that 
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if he wa_nted the fence moved he would have to 
go to court. (R. 75-76). Dover further testified that 
he had lived on the Carter property for many years 
and that his father had owned the Lindner property 
for many years and that the Lindner property had 
been enclosed with a wire fence which ran along 
its West boundary only to the actual property line 
of the Carter property and never extended beyond 
that. There had also been some coal sheds on the 
actual property line. These sheds were probably 
removed when Lindner put up the fence but the 
old wire fence was still in existence until the new 
fence was erected. (R. 73-74, 76-78). 
Carter requested Lindner and Wood to remove 
the fence when he took possession of the property 
in 1964 but they again refused. Carter has conducted 
an antique business on his property which requires 
substantial storage and display space. (R. 30). Be-
cause Carter has been denied the use of this prop-
erty, he has been required to rent storage space 
elsewhere at a cost and loss to him of $1,880.00. 
(R. 48). 
In 1965 Lindner and Wood executed and re-
corded a deed conveying their property from their 
partnership to themselves as individuals. In that 
deed they did not include the 24.35 feet of property 
to which they now claim ownership. (Ex. P-12). At 
that time they were making no claim of title to the 
property in dispute and were not sure that they 
owned it. (R. 68). 
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THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE BARS ANY EVI-
DENCE OF THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION BE-
TWEEN ROBERT DOVER AND M. A. LINDNER. 
Since Lindner admitted that Robert Dover was 
now dead, plaintiff objected to Lindner's competen-
cy as a witness with respect to any evidence of a 
conversation with Robert Dover. The court reserved 
dscision en the objection and allowed the testimony 
subject to the objection. (R. 62). Section 78-24-2(3) of 
the Utah Code Annotated states: 
The following persons cannot be witnesses: (3) 
A party to any civil action, suit, or proceeding 
... when the adverse party in such action, suit 
or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or de-
fends, as . . . assignee or grantee, directly or 
remotely, of c_;uch heir, legatee or devisee (of any 
deceased person), as to any statement by, or 
transaction with, such deceased ... person ... 
In this case we have an alleged conversation be-
tween a deceased person and the defendant Lind-
ner, who is a party to this action, and the adverse 
parties are grantees and assignees of the deceased 
person. Clearly the statute was intended to prevent 
the kind of testimony offered by Mr. Lindner and 
therefore the objection thereto should have been 
sustained. This would delete from the record the 
only possible evidence on which defendants could 
base any claim to the property in dispute. Judgment 
for respondents must follow. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS HA VE NOT PROVED THE RE-
QUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO E S T A B L I S H 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
Appellants' brief cites a number of cases from 
foreign jurisdictions in an attempt to support their 
claims. In doing so they fail to distinguish and in 
fact confuse the different requirements for boundary 
by acquiescence and boundary by agreement. These 
are two separate doctrines in the law and must be 
discussed separately. 
Boundary by acquiescence is discussed ex-
tensively in 3 U~ah Law Review 504 (1953) and the 
prerequisites for application of this doctrine were 
most recently set out as follows in Fuoco v. Williams, 
15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1956): 
( 1) Occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings, (2) Mutual 
Acquiescence in the line as the boundary, :cq 
for a long period of years, ( 4) by adjoining 
land owners. 
In the instant case these prerequisites were not 
met. The testimony of Mr. Lindner as to a conversa-
tion with Robert Dover may as easily imply an intent 
to permit Lindner to use his land temporarily as it 
would an attempt to establish a boundary. Further-
more, it cannot be said that there was mutual ac-
quiescence when Frank Dover expressed his ob-
jection to the fence in 1957 (R. 76), and Mr. Carter 
also objected after he came into possession. (R. 30). 
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The :i.cquiescence must continue for a long pe-
riod of ti:ne which in Utah has been interpreted to 
mean at least twenty years. See 3 Utah Law Review 
504, 506 (1953); King v. Fronk. 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 
P.2d 893, 897 (1963). Here only twelve years elapsed 
between the alleged agreement and the institution 
of this suit with objections to the fence having been 
made in the interim. 
It is also significant that appellants made a deed 
to their property in 1965 without including the prop-
erty South of the fence which they claim to own. 
(P-12). This indicates a lack of acquiescence on their 
part. They were making no claim to the Carter prop-
erty or any pa.rt of it at that time. (R. 68). 
It is a.lso a requirement for boundary by acquies-
cence tha.t there be some dispute or uncertainty as 
to the location of the true boundary. Nunley v. 
Walker. 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962); Willie v. 
Local ~~alty Co., 110 Utah 523, 531, 175 P.2d 78, 723 
(946); Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912 (1928). 
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of any 
dispute or uncertainty as to the location ofl the true 
line. In fact the evidence shows that defendants had 
a prior fence which enclosed only their own prop-
erty and none of plaintiff's property which was re-
moved when the new fence was erected. This old 
fence would have located the actual boundary and 
there would not have been any uncertainty. Further-
more the abstract of title to the Lindner property (Ex. 
D-13) clearly shows that the property description did 
not begin in the center of the street as appellants 
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state was possible. The description starts at the edge 
of the street and runs South from there. 
Furthermore, the claim of uncertainty might be 
credible if the dista.nce between the actual boundary 
and the fence were only a few feet. But here there 
is a difference of 24.35 feet. On a lot only 16.5 feet 
wide, as is the case with the Carter property, a depth 
of 24.35 feet is ra.ther large and would certainly be 
noticed. Under these circumstances it is not reason-
able to assume that there was any uncertainty about 
the boundary linie when the new fence was erected. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS HA VE NOT PROVED THE RE-
QUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH BOUND-
ARY BY AGREEMENT. 
This is apparently the doctrine relied upon by 
defendants. Where a boundary line is in dispute or 
uncertain, adjoining land owners may orally agree 
upon a certain line as the boundary between their 
properties and such agreement will be binding on 
them and their successors if they occupy and possess 
the land up to the boundary and acquiesce in the 
established line for a long period of time. See 3 
Utah Law Review 504 (1953) at 504, Footnote 1, and 
the cases discussed therein. 
The requirements here are similar to those for 
boundary by acquiescence, the difference being that 
an actual agreement is necessary. However, in spite 
of the claims made in defendants' brief by citing 
cases from foreign jurisdictions they cannot escape 
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the necessity for showing uncertainty as to the true 
line and acquiescence in the established line for a 
long perbd of time. The lack of these elements in 
this case requires the court to affirm the lower court's 
finding in plaintiff's favor. 
Them are few cases in Utah applying or discus-
sing the doctrine of boundary by agreement. Every 
Utah case applying the rule has contained the ele-
ment of acquiescence in the agreed upon line. In 
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 66, 276 Pac. 912, 916 
(1928), the court noted that the fence which marked 
the claimed boundary had been established "for a 
sufficiently long period to support" the claim. In 
Rydalch v. Anderson. 37 Utah 99, 112, 107 Pac. 25, 
30 0910), the parties had agreed upon a boundary 
line but vvere allowed to abandon it in favor of the 
true line as established by a later survey. And as 
noted in 3 Utah Law Review 504 (1953) at 504, Foot-
note 1: 
If acquiescence were not requi1cd to m:ik:~ : > 
agreement binding, the abandonment of the 
agreed boundary would have been contrary to 
the Statute of Frauds as it would have become 
the true boundary and as the parties would 
not likely at that time have been uncertain 
about or disputing the boundary. 
Blanchard v. Smith. 123 Utah 119, 255 P.2d 729, 730 
(1953) states that "neighbors by oral agreement may 
establish a common boundary which, after sufficent-
ly long acquiescence, cannot be disestablished." 
Acquiescence for a long time therefore being a 
necessary element to appellants' case, the failure 
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to show i: and respondents' showing of no acquies-
cence more than justifies the lower court's judgment. 
Moreover, appellants have failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence the existence of an 
agreeme!"1t, the most important element of their case. 
The lower court found in favor of respondents after 
observing and hearing the witnesses and its find-
ings are therefore entitled to great weight. Even if 
there had. been an agreement, Blanchard v. Smith, 
supra, implies that such an agreement is not binding 
if arrived at by mutual mistake, citing 8 AM. JUR. 
Boundaries § 77. This same authority is now found 
in 12 AM. JOR. 2d Boundaries § 82, at 618, and is 
quoted here: 
If adjoining landowners are in doubt as to the 
location of a boundary line between their lands, 
neither assur'ling to know its location, and, 
upon this basis, undertake by a parol agreement 
to fix a line as the boundary line, such agree-
ment, when executed, is to be given effect not-
withstanding they may have been mistaken as 
to the location of the true line, if there has been 
no fraud or concealment on the part of one 
party which would mislead the other. If, how-
ever, the parties undertake by a parol agree-
ment to fix the location of a boundary line 
under the belief that they are fixing the true 
boundary line, when, in fact, it is not, their 
agreement is not binding and may be set aside 
by either party upon the discovery of the 
mistake, unless there is some element of 
estoppe! whcih would prevent it, as where the 
rights of innocent third parties have inter-
vened. 
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This principle is extremely important here since 
from Mr. Lindner's own testimony, he and Mr. Dover 
were not attempting to fix a boundary line in place 
of the trut:: line whose location was unknown. Rather 
they were attempting to fix a line under the belief 
that they were fixing the true boundary line. Ac-
cording to Lindner, Dover said "You can put your 
fence here. I think this is my property line." (R. 63). 
Based on this mutual mistake as to the true boundary 
line, the supposed agreement could be set aside by 
either party. In a situ;;i.tion where one party may 
otherwise be innocently deprived of 24.35 feet of 
his property, justice demands that such an agree-
tnent,· if made, be set aside. The lower court's judg-
ment should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AW ARD DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT CARTER FOR 
HIS LOSSES. 
Carter testified at the trial that because he was 
deprived of the use of his property by Lindner and 
Wood, he had been required to rent storage space 
elsewhere at a cost to him of $1,880.00 over a four 
year period. m. 48). Carter conducts an antique busi-
ness on his property which requires extensive dis-
play and storage space. (R 30). He demanded that 
Lindner and \J'J ood remove the fence so he could 
make use of the balance of his property. Their re-
fusal to do so forced him to look elsewhere for space 
and his cost to obtain such space was not contro-
verted at the trial. Since Lindner and Wood wrong-
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fully deprived Carter of the use of his property, 
lia_bilitv for the damages caused thereby should fol-
low. The court's failure to award such damages was 
an error ·which should be corrected on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
By introducing the Abstract of Title and the con-
tract showing plaintiff's interest, plaintiff presented 
a prima fa.cia case of title to the disputed property 
in Frank Dover and his wife subject to plaintiff's con-
cract rights. The burden of proof to show boundary 
by acquiescence or by agreement was then upon 
defendants. The Dead Man's Statute precludes any 
evidence to support their claim and even such evi-
c~ence as was offered by defendants fails to show the 
necessary elements required by the law of the state 
of Utah. The lower court's decree quieting title to 
the property in Dovers and Carter should therefore 
be :i.ffirm ed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & 
CLrYo_f::\ By,\~'1~ 
RALPH J. MARSH 
1111 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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